American cities have rarely been left to fend for themselves entirely, yet the federal government’s role in shaping them has swung dramatically across the decades. From the late 1970s onward, urban policy in the United States moved through distinct phases shaped by competing beliefs about who should fix struggling cities and how. Should Washington pour money into distressed neighbourhoods directly? Should it step back and let private enterprise do the work? Or should it act as a coordinator, stitching together the efforts of states, cities, businesses, and communities? Tracing this evolution from Jimmy Carter to Barack Obama reveals how economic crises, political ideology, and shifting ideas about federalism repeatedly redefined the relationship between the national government and the urban landscape.
Table of Contents
- From Carter to Reagan: reversing decline, then retreating
- The Carter approach
- The Reagan reversal
- Clinton’s approach: fiscal discipline meets targeted opportunity
- The empowerment zone idea
- A new model of partnership
- Current policy trends: the Obama era and a coordinated federal commitment
- Breaking down the silos
- Affordable housing, clean technology, and jobs
- The bigger picture: a pendulum that keeps swinging
From Carter to Reagan: reversing decline, then retreating
By the late 1970s, many American cities were in visible trouble. Industrial jobs were disappearing, populations were moving to the suburbs, and the tax bases that funded city services were shrinking. The federal government had already begun pulling back: federal aid to cities started shrinking in the 1970s after the high-water mark of the Great Society programmes of the 1960s.
The Carter approach
The Carter administration tried to confront urban decline directly. In response to a political constituency concerned about cities and a fragile recovery from the 1974-75 recession, the administration proposed counter-cyclical assistance to local governments and economic development programmes targeted at areas in distress. The most important policy innovation was the Urban Development Action Grant (UDAG) programme, enacted in October 1977. It was designed to stimulate economic recovery in the most distressed urban areas and provided $400 million in each of its first two years.
UDAG worked on a simple principle: federal money would be used to attract private investment rather than replace it. Cities used the funds largely to make loans to private developers, and grants required matching private financial commitments. In a March 1978 message to Congress, Carter also proposed substantial increases for UDAG and other programmes to leverage new private sector investment in urban areas. The idea of public money “leveraging” private capital became a defining feature of the era. By the programme’s second anniversary in 1979, Carter celebrated hundreds of approved projects and billions of dollars in private sector commitments to distressed cities.
Yet Carter’s ambitions were repeatedly checked. As fiscal conservatism and fears of another recession grew, his targeted proposals fared poorly in Congress, and urban policy was eventually eclipsed by a broader “reindustrialisation” agenda. In a sense, the Carter years already contained the seeds of a shift away from direct federal intervention.
The Reagan reversal
The election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 brought an abrupt change. Reagan argued that urban problems were best solved locally, and that cities could fix their own problems as long as their local economies were strong. His approach rested on three pillars: cutting federal programmes, shifting the distribution of federal dollars from federal agencies to state governments, and reducing federal regulation.
The Reagan administration’s economic philosophy was rooted in supply-side economics, aiming to reduce government spending, cut marginal tax rates, reduce regulation, and control the money supply to bring down inflation. Applied to cities, this meant a sharp turn towards minimal public involvement and reliance on private enterprise.
The numbers tell the story of retreat. Between 1980 and 1988, budgetary authority for the Department of Housing and Urban Development fell from $36 billion to $15 billion, a larger decline than any other department. The administration also consolidated dozens of programmes into block grants through the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, moving decision-making to states while simultaneously reducing federal funding responsibility. The dependence of cities on Washington collapsed: in 1980 federal dollars made up 22 percent of big city budgets, but by the end of Reagan’s second term, federal aid had fallen to just 6 percent.
Reagan’s preferred tool was the Enterprise Zone, an idea that originated with British planner Peter Hall as a way to encourage business growth in declining areas through tax incentives and reduced regulation. The philosophy was clear: instead of government spending its way out of urban decline, the market would do the work if barriers were removed.
Clinton’s approach: fiscal discipline meets targeted opportunity
When Bill Clinton entered the White House in 1992, many hoped for a return to robust federal investment in cities. They were largely disappointed. As one account notes, Clinton rejected a restoration of pre-1980s levels of urban spending, sacrificing an ambitious infrastructure programme in favour of deficit reduction. The new administration prioritised fiscal integrity and middle-class relief over big-spending urban renewal.
The empowerment zone idea
Clinton’s signature urban policy was the Empowerment Zone and Enterprise Community (EZ/EC) programme, established through the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993. It was a careful balancing act. The programme drew heavily on the pro-market enterprise zone concept promoted under Reagan, but it added a layer of direct federal investment that the earlier model lacked.
The crucial difference was the combination of tools. The Clinton plan combined tax incentives to lure new businesses into the zones with grants, or targeted government investment, to improve the zones’ social and economic infrastructure. It also created two tiers of assistance: a smaller number of Empowerment Zones with significant benefits, and a larger number of Enterprise Communities with fewer incentives. The first round created nine Empowerment Zones and ninety-five Enterprise Communities at a federal cost of $3.5 billion over five years.
A new model of partnership
Beyond the money, the EZ/EC programme reflected a distinct governance philosophy. Clinton argued that the best way to serve distressed communities was through a comprehensive, coordinated approach combining bottom-up initiatives and private sector innovation with federal-state support. To run it, he appointed Vice President Al Gore to chair a new Community Enterprise Board, with cabinet secretaries as members.
The programme’s tools included tax breaks, block grants, funding preferences, and the flexibility to waive certain federal barriers. Communities had to demonstrate their commitment by participating in a plan to develop and implement these tools, which encouraged grassroots planning rather than top-down direction. This emphasis on metropolitan opportunity and locally driven revitalisation distinguished Clinton’s model from both Carter’s targeted spending and Reagan’s hands-off stance. Over time, the initiative expanded across multiple rounds, eventually designating more than 130 distressed communities and, by the administration’s account, leveraging over $10 billion in additional public and private investment.
Critics on both sides were unconvinced. Conservatives argued the zones were over-managed from Washington, while some on the left contended that the empowerment zones reflected a continued failure to reinvest seriously in struggling inner-city communities. Clinton himself reassured observers that the programme was “not the Great Society”, signalling how far the political centre had moved since the 1970s.
Current policy trends: the Obama era and a coordinated federal commitment
The Obama administration, which took office during the Great Recession, brought a renewed federal commitment to cities, though one shaped heavily by the economic crisis. Rather than a single flagship programme, the approach emphasised coordination across agencies, job creation, clean technology, and affordable housing.
Breaking down the silos
A central feature was institutional reform. The administration created a White House Office of Urban Affairs and, in 2009, directed several agencies to conduct a comprehensive review of federal programmes affecting places, the first of its kind in thirty years. This “place-based” approach aimed to make federal policy work better for neighbourhoods, cities, and entire metropolitan regions at once.
One scholar described the Obama urban policy as interdepartmental, multijurisdictional, comprehensive, inclusive, and evidence-based. The goal was to break down the agency silos that had long fragmented urban policy, leveraging limited discretionary funds across departments.
Affordable housing, clean technology, and jobs
The administration tied urban revitalisation to housing recovery and environmental goals. Through the interagency Partnership for Sustainable Communities, created in 2009, the White House pushed agencies like HUD, the EPA, and the Department of Transportation to coordinate their grant-making and promote mixed-use, walkable, transit-oriented development, so that affordable housing near transit hubs would receive funding preference.
Clean technology became a notable thread. The Clean Energy Savings for All Initiative was a cross-government partnership between the Departments of Energy, Housing and Urban Development, Agriculture, Health and Human Services, Veterans Affairs, and the EPA to increase access to solar energy and promote energy efficiency, particularly in low- and moderate-income communities. Programmes like the Better Buildings Challenge expanded to multifamily housing, partnering with affordable housing owners and public housing agencies to cut energy waste and help families save on utility bills.
On housing itself, the administration positioned affordable housing as central to opportunity. Its housing agenda focused on supporting the market’s recovery from the foreclosure crisis, preserving public housing, investing in new affordable housing, and working with states and cities to address homelessness. The revived Interagency Council on Homelessness reflected this renewed federal engagement.
The bigger picture: a pendulum that keeps swinging
Looking across these phases, a clear pattern emerges. Carter believed the federal government should target distressed cities directly while using public money to attract private capital. Reagan rejected that role almost entirely, betting that tax cuts, deregulation, and devolution to states would let local economies revive cities on their own. Clinton found a middle path, blending the market-oriented enterprise zone with targeted federal grants and grassroots planning. Obama returned to a more active federal role, but one focused on coordination, sustainability, and crisis recovery rather than large-scale direct spending.
What unites every phase is the persistent tension between three forces: the federal government’s willingness to spend, the reliance on private enterprise, and the question of how much authority should rest with states and cities. Each administration recalibrated this balance according to its ideology and the economic conditions it inherited. Understanding these shifts matters far beyond American borders, because the debate over whether national governments should lead urban renewal, step back, or simply coordinate is one that policymakers everywhere continue to confront.
What do you think? If you were advising a national government on reviving struggling cities, would you favour direct federal investment, market-led incentives, or a coordinated partnership model? And which of these American approaches do you think offers the most useful lessons for rapidly urbanising regions today?
References
- https://hedgehogreview.com/web-features/common-place/posts/urban-policy-part-3-lessons-from-history
- https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6z39c74x
- http://www.nbfplarchive.org/nbrevitalization/files/nb_images/belvin_photos/nj_business_news_articles__recordings/udag-targeting_urban_economic_development.pdf
- https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/national-urban-policy-message-the-congress
- https://sk.sagepub.com/ency/edvol/urbanhistory/chpt/reagan-administration-urban-policy
- https://www.iedconline.org/clientuploads/Downloads/history/Forty_Years_Urban_Economic_Development.pdf
- https://shelterforce.org/2004/05/01/reagans-legacy-homelessness-in-america/
- https://philadelphiaencyclopedia.org/essays/enterprise-zones-and-empowerment-zones/
- https://www.referenceforbusiness.com/encyclopedia/Eco-Ent/Empowerment-Zones.html
- https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1023&context=jlasc
- https://www.ojp.gov/ncjrs/virtual-library/abstracts/urban-empowerment-zones-and-enterprise-communities
- https://clintonwhitehouse4.archives.gov/textonly/WH/New/New_Markets_Nov/factsheets/chicago.html
- https://jacobin.com/2016/04/hillary-clinton-race-empowerment-zones-urban-policy/
- https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/administration/eop/oua/initiatives/working-groups
- https://medium.com/challenges-to-democracy/first-chapter-national-urban-policy-in-the-age-of-obama-by-hilary-silver-31ad742bd27d
- https://grist.org/cities/obama-pushes-to-make-cities-denser-and-more-affordable/
- https://www.energy.gov/eere/solar/articles/fact-sheet-obama-administration-announces-clean-energy-savings-all-americans
- https://www.energy.gov/femp/articles/obama-administration-expands-better-buildings-challenge-multifamily-housing-launches
- https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/administration/cabinet/exit-memos/department-housing-urban-development
Leave a Reply